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ABSTRACT 
We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in entrepreneurial ability, and may 
decide to become workers or entrepreneurs. The government is motivated by a 
production externality to impose regulations on entrepreneurship, and sets a level of red 
tape -administered by public officials-to test regulation compliance. In an environment 
where some officials are corrupt, we study what are the optimal levels of regulations and 
red tape, and to what extent such policies reduce the welfare losses created by corruption. 
For each level of externalities, we find that high and low levels of corruption create 
qualitatively different distortions, which in turn changes the nature and reach of optimal 
policies. Under low levels of corruption and externalities, the government sets low levels 
of regulations and minimal red tape, and with these policies achieves the first best 
allocation. When externalities and corruption are above a threshold, only a second best 
allocation can be achieved. Moreover, when externalities are large, mandating higher 
levels of red tape is a Pareto improving policy. 
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1 Introduction
In The Other Path (de Soto [1990]), Hernando de Soto presents a rendition
of the effects of bureaucratic corruption and red tape on entrepreneurship,
describing how burdensome requirements and delays caused by government
mandated red tape discourage the poorest entrepreneurs from setting up
shop. A large part of the academic literature on corruption focuses on the
same issues: How regulations, red tape, and corruption interact to affect
growth, investment, and economic efficiency in general. The image of corrupt
economies with high levels of regulatory burden transpires throughout.
However, a summary look at the country level data on the level of regu-
lations, understood as government mandated restrictions on emissions levels,
zoning regulations, and the like, as well as red tape, taken to be the pa-
perwork and time resources necessary to, say, set up a business, suggests a
different picture: Developed economies with low levels of corruption display
typically very high levels of regulation, and relatively low levels of red tape,
while corrupt economies tend to have low levels of regulations, but high red
tape. Djankov et al. [2002] describe the time delays and number of procedures
necessary to start a business in a cross section of countries. In their data,
countries in the first quartile of the income distribution require 7.17 proce-
dures, taking up 43.17 days in average, while countries in the fourth quartile
require 11.21 procedures which take an average of 73 days. These measures of
red tape are also correlated with corruption. For the stringency of regulations
policies, the point can be exemplified by comparing emmissions standards in
the EU and Asian countries: New EU standards are implemented in Asia
with a median lag of up to nine years (see IADB [2003]).
In this paper, we build on the distinct nature of government mandated
regulations and red tape and study their effects in the presence of corruption.
We are motivated by the question of what are the optimal choices with re-
gards to these two policy variables in a corrupt economy, and to what extent
a judicious choice of both the level of regulations and red tape may reduce
the distortions caused by corruption.
We present a model with agents that are heterogeneous in entrepreneurial
ability, and may choose to become either salaried workers -for the public bu-
reaucracy or the private sector- or entrepreneurs. The existence of the public
bureaucracy is motivated by a Pigovian role: Investment projects create neg-
ative externalities, government mandated regulations aim to impose private
abatement of these externalities, and public bureaucrats test that such reg-
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ulations have been complied with. Some officials are corrupt, and will ask
for a bribe in exchange for extending the investment permit. Officials are
assigned randomly to entrepreneurs, who may choose to abide by the regu-
lations or not beforehand. Entrepreneurs also have the choice of searching
for a different official, making the problem effectively dynamic for them. In
this context, regulations take the form of a fixed cost to entrepreneurs, while
red tape is the number of investment permits necessary to start operations,
and therefore its cost is in the form of time delays between investment and
production.
Although the distorsions caused by corruption are endogenous to policy
choices, our paper takes the corrupt behavior of some officials as given, and
is silent on the effects of policies destined at penalizing such behavior. This
approach recognizes the fact that corruption is persistent and difficult to
erradicate, and examines alternative policy tools that can be used to limit
its effects.
This paper falls within a growing theoretical literature on the economics
of corruption. Cadot [1987] presents a model where agents need to be granted
a permit to invest and are assigned government officials randomly. The stage
game of our model borrows the basic idea of random assignment of officials
to entrepreneurs. Acemoglu and Verdier [1998] present a model where the
bureaucrats’ role is to enforce property rights. While both these papers
focus on bureaucrats wages as the relevant policy tool, Bliss and Tella [1997]
examine the effects of changes in the level of competition on the effects of
corruption. In contrast, our paper focuses on the level of regulations and
red tape as tools to limit the effects of corruption. Finally, Guriev [2004] is
one of the first papers to address explicitly the role of government mandated
red tape in an economy with corruption. In that model, red tape is costly,
but serves to disclose information to bureaucrats about the project type. In
contrast with most of the literature, excepting Acemoglu and Verdier [1998],
we adopt a general equilibrium approach, where the size of the public sector
is endogenous to the need for public officials.
There is a small empirical literature that examines the nature of corrup-
tion at the firm and individual level. Svensson [2003] reports on the nature
of bribery in a sample of Ugandan firms, and finds evidence for bribes being
related to profits and to the outside options of the firms. Hunt and Laszlo
[2005] study individual level bribery using responses from a peruvian house-
hold survey. They also find that officials are price discriminators, and bribes
are a function of income. Our model is broadly consistent with these facts.
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The study by Djankov et al. [2002] mentioned above is also of direct rele-
vance to our paper. In that work, the authors find that stricter regulation
of entry is not associated with better public goods across countries, but is
associated with higher corruption. They conclude that the evidence points
to regulations and red tape being installed by corrupt officials to their own
benefit. In this paper, while allowing officials to be corrupt, we give a benev-
olent government the possibility of determining the levels of such variables,
and focus on the normative aspect of the problem.
A common theme reappears through our results: high and low corruption
give rise to qualitatively different economies. Not only the nature of optimal
government policies is different in both cases, but also the extent to which
such policies reduce the deadweight losses caused by corruption. Technically,
our model is characterized by two types of equilibria. In the first equilibrium,
with low corruption and a low level of externalities, all entrepreneurs follow
the regulations, but investment is inefficiently low if regulations are set at
their no-corruption level. In this case, a minimal level of red tape, and a level
of regulations lower than with no corruption is optimal, and such policies
actually achieve the first best. The second equilibrium obtains for a level of
corruption and externalities above a threshold. In this case, entrepreneurs at
the lower end of the ability distribution choose not to follow the regulations.
The optimal policies in this equilibrium cannot achieve the first best, and
may include a higher-than-minimal level of red tape. In particular, when
production externalities are large, a higher level of red tape will improve
welfare by discouraging inefficient entrepreneurs.
This paper has four other sections. The next section presents the model
and defines the equilibrium concept. Section three examines the equilibrium,
while section four studies what are the socially optimal policies. Section five
concludes.
2 Model
We study an economy with a continuum of infinitely lived agents of size
one. Each agent is endowed with a unit of labor supply and with a level of
entrepreneurial ability R, drawn from a distribution with c.d.f. G(R). We
assume that G(R) is once differentiable with G′ = g.
Agents have preferences for consumption c and a public good X repre-
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sented by
U = E
∞∑
t=0
δt{ct −Xt} (1)
Subject to the constraint
at(1 + rt) + incomet = ct + at+1 + τ (2)
Where δ is a discount factor, at are assets at the beginning of period t, and
τ is a lump sum tax. The variable income depends on the agents occupation
in a way that will be made clear in what follows.
Agents may choose to use their skills in one of two different occupations.
They may be workers -either for the government or the private sector- and
supply labor at the market wage w, or they can become entrepreneurs.
The corrupt nature of some officials is imposed exogenously: Once agents
become government officials, they are revealed to be corrupt with probability
p. Because corruption incidence is at best slow to control, it is sensible to
take the corrupt nature of government officials as given, and study what
government policies will limit the effects of such corruption on efficiency.
This is the approach we take in this paper.
Because the wage rates in the government and private sectors are equal,
expected utility suggests that all workers -as well as some entrepreneurs-
would prefer to become government officials. To simplify the analysis, we
assume that the government chooses its officials among those with the lowest
entrepreneurial ability. This assumption simplifies the analysis by making
the choice of becoming a public official exogenous to the agents. In turn, this
ensures that the choice of becoming a worker/entrepreneur is not affected
by the possibility of earning bribes in the public sector. An alternative
assumption would be to penalize corrupt officials with an amount and a
frequency that makes their expected income equal to the competitive wage.
With the government picking its officials, we can focus on the agents’
decisions to invest vs. work. The timing of decisions is shown in figure 1.
The value function for an individual who has to decide whether to work or
become an entrepreneur is the solution to 1
v = max{ve, w + δv} (3)
where w is the wage rate, and ve is the value of becoming an entrepreneur
and following the optimal policies thereafter. A solution to 3 is a function
1Since utility is linear, agents can be seen as maximizing discounted wealth.
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Π : R+ → {1, 0} that maps values of R to an occupational choice: Whether
to become an entrepreneur (1), or a worker (0). In order to define ve, we
proceed to discuss the problem faced by entrepreneurs.
If an agent decides to become an entrepreneur, she incurs in an investment
cost of i, and must have the project certified for regulations compliance
by government officials. Such regulations, if followed, impose a cost α on
investors. Our measure of red tape is the number of certifications needed
to make a project operational. Since certifications can only be obtained
sequentially, red tape imposes a burden in terms of a time delay between the
time of investment and that of production. In this paper we study the case
of Low red tape, where only one certification is needed, and that of High
red tape, where two certifications are needed. In this section we describe
the model for a Low red tape economy, the extension to a High red tape
environment being mechanic.
After investing and obtaining a certification, entrepreneurs organize pro-
duction by hiring labor (L) and using their own entrepreneurial ability (Ri)
according to the production function
F (Ri, L) = L+Ri, (4)
After the project becomes operational and produces output, it depreciates
completely. We adopt a linear technology for simplicity. The expression for
the wage rate is FL. After paying wages, entrepreneurs obtain a gross profit
of F − FLL.
Because entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their ability Ri, which deter-
mines the rate of return of their projects, it is sensible to normalize the cost
of the project to i, as we have done. In the current framework investors may
only manage one project at a time and, as will become clear below, invest-
ment and production will not necessarily take place in the same period.
To obtain certifications for their projects, investors get a random draw of
a government official. Officials are of two types: A proportion 1−p of them is
honest, and verify that regulations have been followed. If they have not, the
certification is simply not given. The remaining officials are corrupt and ask
for a bribe β in exchange of the certification. When faced with either type
of official, investors may also decide to keep searching for a different type (or
to withdraw from the process altogether, but we disregard this possibility as
it is never chosen in equilibrium). We assume for simplicity that each official
reviews one project.
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In choosing whether to follow the regulations, the entrepreneur chooses
the compliance policy that solves
ve = −i+max{vs(0),−α+ vs(1)} (5)
Where vs(1[α]) is the expected value of searching for an official. The argument
in vs(.) is an indicator that takes the value one when the regulations have
been followed. A solution to (5) is a policy function Λ : R+ → {0, 1} that
maps values of R to a decision of whether to comply (1) or not (0) with the
regulations The function vs is defined as
vs(0) = pvc(0) + (1− p)vh(0) (6)
vs(1) = pvc(1) + (1− p)vh(1) (7)
The functions vc and vh in turn represent value functions for agents who have
already drawn an official from the lottery, where the subscript of the value
functions refers to the type of official (corrupt or honest). They are solutions
to the following Bellman equations:
vc(0) = max{Ri − β + δv, δvs(0)} (8)
vc(1) = max{Ri − β + δv, δvs(1)} (9)
vh(0) = δvs(0) (10)
vh(1) = max{Ri + δv, δvs(1)} (11)
In expressions 8 to 11 we impose the equilibrium result that 1
1+rt
= δ, where
rt is the interest rate. In expressions 8 and 10 we also impose the equilibrium
feature that, if no compliance was optimal at time zero, it will remain the
optimal choice regardless of the history of draws 2. Equilibrium search costs
are then constant over time and proportional to δ. The solution to {vc, vh} in
(8) to (11) is a pair of policy functions sc,h : {1, 0} ×R+ → {accept, search}
that map a value of R and a compliance choice Λ to a decision of whether
to accept the official’s offer (accept) or keep searching for a different official
(search). Note that the decision to accept the offer involves paying a bribe
if the official is corrupt, and simply accepting the certification if it is honest.
We now describe how the bribe level (β) is determined. When the investor
draws a corrupt official, the bribe will be determined by Nash bargaining,
2Otherwise we would substitute δvs(0) for the equivalent, but more cumbersome
δmax{vs(0),−α+ vs(1)}.
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where the bargaining power of the official is θ. While the reservation value
for the corrupt official is zero, the reservation value for the investor is the
discounted value of searching (δvs). The bribe is then determined by solving
max
β
(β)θ(Ri − β + δve − δvs)1−θ (12)
So the equilibrium bribe will be a function of the return of the project Ri,
which is observable by the official 3. Using Nash bargaining as the solution
concept for the bribe game allows for a simple rule of surplus sharing between
corrupt officials and investors:
β(R) = θ(Ri + δ(ve − vs)) (13)
At this point, it should be clear that the variable incomet is random both
for the corrupt official and for the entrepreneur
incomet =

wt if work, honest official
wt + βt if corrupt official
pit(R) if entrepreneur
(14)
Where we use the convention that βt = 0 if the bribe is not paid, and pit(R)
are the net profits for an entrepreneur of type R at time t. Note that βt is a
random variable for the official, who will be given a draw of an entrepreneur.
For the entrepreneur, net profits pit are also random, as they depend on the
draw of government officials.
The government finances the public wage bill by levying a lump sum tax
τ on all agents, since it maintains a balanced budget, and there are as many
officials as projects, we have:
τt = wt
∫
i is entrepreneur
dG(i) (15)
The existence of the government is motivated by a Pigovian role: Each invest-
ment project creates a negative externality of γ when it becomes operational;
a technology is available that corrects this externality, and the government
mandates its use by imposing restrictions to investment in the form of gov-
ernment regulations. As mentioned above, such regulations imply a cost α
3We use v and ve interchangeably for investors, as they will be equal in all future
periods
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on projects. The net externality created by an individual investment project
takes the form
x = γ − α (16)
Where α is a policy variable for the government, and we take α = 0 if
the entrepreneur decides not to follow the regulations. The externality as
perceived by the agents is naturally the integral of x over all operational
projects.
The agents’ problem is then to maximize the utility function in 1 subject
to the budget constraint 2, by choosing compliance, occupation and search
policies that solve 3 to 11, taking α, β and X as given.
The equilibrium objects for this economy are a set of Bellman equations
for {v, ve, vc, vh}, along with a bribe function β : R+ → R+ that solves 12, a
rule to determine the agent’s occupation Π : R+ → {1, 0} that solves 3, a set
of search policies for honest and corrupt officials contingent on R, and the
compliance choice {sh, sc} : {0, 1} × R+ → {accept, search} that solves 8 to
11, and a compliance rule Λ : R+ → {0, 1} that solves 5.
This environment may be seen as a repeated game between corrupt of-
ficials and entrepreneurs, with nature determining the type of official. It is
natural in this case to impose subgame perfection on the equilibrium poli-
cies. In particular, when the bribe is bargained we restrict the reservation
value for the entrepreneur to be that which is derived from policies that are
optimal in the subgame that starts from next period on (if the entrepreneur
keeps on searching). We refer to this as the threat points being credible.
Equilibrium An equilibrium is a set of Bellman equations for {v, ve, vc, vh},
a bribe function β, an investment rule Π, a rule for following regulations Λ
and a set of search policies {sh, sc}, that satisfy:
1. The bribe function β is a solution to problem (12), where the threat
points δvs are credible.
2. Given β, the search policy functions {sh, sc} solve the Bellman equa-
tions {vh, vc} in (8) to (11).
3. Given {β, sh, sc}, the investment rule Π solve the Bellman equation v
in 3.
4. The compliance rule Λ solves Bellman equation ve in (5).
5. The government budget given by 15 is balanced.
In the next section we characterize the equilibrium.
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3 Equilibrium
We consider stationary equilibria of the model, where the proportion of en-
trepreneurs who follow a given optimal plan, as well as workers, are constant.
For the model just described, focusing on the stationary equilibrium involves
little loss of generality, as the economy would jump to this equilibrium start-
ing from an initial condition with no sunk investments. We begin by noting
that prices in this competitive environment are
w = 1 (17)
r =
1− δ
δ
(18)
Expression 17 follows from the linearity of the production function, while 18
follows from the linearity of preferences as well.
3.1 Equilibrium under Low red tape
To characterize the optimal strategies 4, we proceed by backwards induction,
first deriving the optimal choices and payoffs of an agent who chose to invest,
and then deriving the conditions under which this decision is optimal. We
begin by noting that, because of the recursive nature of the problem, we can
focus on time invariant plans. For an agent who has become entrepreneur
by investing i, a plan is a compliance choice plus a search policy {Λ, sh, sc}.
Note that there is potentially a large number of candidate plans to consider.
As the next result shows however, we can limit our attention to two such
plans.
Lemma 1 For entrepreneurs, at most two plans are used in equilibrium
{Λ, sh, sc} ∈ {{1, accept, accept}, {0, search, accept}} (19)
The proof is in appendix A. For simplicity we will refer to {1, accept, accept}
as plan 1, and {0, search, accept} as plan 2. An immediate consequence of
there being two observed plans is that there will be two bribes (as functions
of R), since the threat points δvs -the value of searching- will be different for
both plans.
4We use ‘strategy’ and ‘plan’ interchangeably.
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For plan 1, the entrepreneur decides to follow the regulations, in which
case she will receive the certification if facing an honest official in the draw.
If she draws a corrupt official on the other hand, she will pay the bribe. Note
that in this case all investment projects become operational in the same
period the investment takes place.
For plan 2, the investor does not comply with the regulations, so she will
search for a corrupt official that can be bribed. Only a fraction p of the
projects following this strategy will become operational every period.
Some intuition can be offered for this lemma. Note that searching when
the agent draws a corrupt official cannot be optimal, as Nash bargaining
by definition gives the agent a share of the surplus above the payoff from
searching. On the other hand, searching if an honest official is drawn is
the only possibility when Λ = 0, and could not be optimal if Λ = 1, since
accepting the certification is done at no marginal cost.
To complete the characterization of the optimal choices by investors and
workers, we need to map the values of R to a choice of plan. Because of the
linear structure of the model, the optimal choices between pairs of plans can
be simply characterized in terms of cutoff points in R.
Lemma 2 There are three levels of R, {R1, R2, R3}, such that
1. Strategy 1 is preferred to strategy 2 for all Ri > R1 with
R1 = iδ + α
1− pθδ
1− p (20)
2. Strategy 2 is preferred to not investing for all Ri > R2, with
R2 = i(
1− δ
p(1− θ) + δ) +
1
p(1− θ) (21)
3. Strategy 1 is preferred to not investing for all Ri > R3, with
R3 = (i+ α)
1− pθδ
1− pθ +
1
1− pθ (22)
Proof: The payoffs are, for not investing
U =
1−X
1− δ (23)
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From following strategy 1,
U = −1− pθδ
1− δ (i+ α) +
1− pθ
1− δ R−
X
1− δ (24)
≡ a1 + a2Ri − a3X
From following strategy 2,
U = −i(1 + δp1− θ
1− δ ) +
p(1− θ)
1− δ R−
X
1− δ (25)
≡ d1 + d2Ri − d3X
For 1, note that a1 < d1, a2 > d2, and a3 = d3 . Since R ∈ R+, there is a
cutoff point such that strategy 1 is preferred to strategy 2 for all R that are
higher. Simple algebra shows that this point is R1. For 2, note that d1 < 1
and d2 > 0, so a cutoff point for the choice between strategy 2 and working
exists. Again simple algebra shows that it is R2. For 3, a similar argument
to 2 applies.
Since R is unbounded, and strategy 1 is optimal for all R > max{R1, R3},
strategy 1 will always be observed in equilibrium. The following corollary
defines the conditions under which strategy 2 will also be observed.
Corollary 1 Strategy 2 is observed iff R1 > R2. This implies the following
condition on the parameters
α > i
(1− δ)(1− p)
p(1− θ)(1− pθδ) +
1− p
p(1− θ)(1− pθδ) (26)
≡ h(i; p, δ, θ)
The proof is in appendix B, and the condition is plotted in figure 2 for selected
values of {i, δ, θ}. Note that plan 2 is observed for {α, p} above a convex
threshold. Agents who follow plan 2 effectively trade in lower investment
costs, as they do not incur in the costs of complying with the regulations, for
a lower probability (p) of being given a certification. This implies a reduced
expected level of profits, which comes from two sources: First, the expected
delay in implementing the project is now 1
p
, reducing the present value of
profits. Second, the bribe to be paid is higher if the agent follows plan 2.
Indeed, the value of searching (vs) is lower if this plan is followed , so the
rents to be divided between the entrepreneur and the corrupt official are
higher, and the bribe is an increasing function of these rents.
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For entrepreneurs who follow plan 1 on the other hand, the payoffs from
obtaining a certification are high enough that the expected costs of waiting
until a corrupt official is drawn, plus the higher bribes to be paid in this case,
would dominate the reduction in costs from not following the regulations.
As expected, entrepreneurs following plan 2 will have lower ability than
those following plan 1. In equilibrium, they will be observed if the economy
displays high costs of regulations α, and low bargaining power of corrupt of-
ficials (hθ > 0). High levels of corruption p raise expected costs by increasing
the bribe level, but also decrease such costs by reducing the expected time
until a corrupt official is drawn. In this case the latter effect dominates and
higher corruption is associated with more entrepreneurs following this plan
(hp > 0). Finally, the effect of δ is ambiguous.
We can now summarize the characterization of the equilibrium of the
model. We do this in the following proposition, which implicitly describes
the optimal policies {s,Π,Λ}.
Proposition 1 (Equilibria) In the model with Low red tape there are two
types of equilibria.
Equilibrium 1 If condition 26 does not hold, agents with R ∈ (0, R3) will
choose to work. Agents with R ∈ [R3,∞) will become entrepreneurs,
abide by the regulations, and choose to pay bribes if they draw a corrupt
official.
Equilibrium 2 If condition 26 holds, agents in R ∈ (0, R2) will choose to
work, agents with R ∈ [R2, R1) will invest, not abide by the regulations,
and search for a corrupt official. Finally, agents with R ∈ [R1,∞) will
follow the regulations, and pay the bribe if they draw a corrupt official.
The proof follows from previous results. As will be discussed below, the
two equilibria have very different policy and welfare implications. The first
equilibrium, which is observed under low corruption, describes an economy
where corruption has similar effects to those of a capital earnings tax. In
the second equilibrium, under high corruption, some investors are induced
to engage in a form of rent seeking behavior, and the distorsions caused by
corruption are more complex than those of a tax. In this sense the model
provides a formal interpretation of the common observation that low and
high corruption are associated with different types of deadweight losses.
12
3.2 Comparative statics: Regulations
We now examine the effects of changing the level of regulations α and red
tape on the equilibrium level of net output and the public good. Note that
output net of depreciation costs i and compliance costs α is the relevant
metric for available resources, and it is the output measure we consider in
what follows. The expression for net output is
Y =
{ ∫∞
R3
(R− i− α)dG(R) + (2G(R3)− 1) in Eq. 1
p
∫ R1
R2
(R− i)dG(R) + ∫∞
R1
(R− i− α)dG(R) + (2G(R2)− 1) in Eq. 2
(27)
Where (2G(.)− 1) is the size of the labor input, which we assume is strictly
positive. The following comparative statics result follows
∂Y
∂α
=
{ −∂R3
∂α
g(R3)(R3− i− α− 1)− (1−G(R3)) + g(R3)∂R3
∂α
in Eq. 1
−g(R1)∂R1
∂α
(R1− i− α) + pg(R1)∂R1
∂α
(R1− i)− (1−G(R1)) in Eq. 2
(28)
In Equilibrium one there are three effects. First, as R3 shifts to the right,
some entrepreneurs become workers, reducing net output (first term in 28,
Eq. 1). Second, all remaining entrepreneurs face higher compliance costs,
which reduces output accordingly (second term). Third, as R3 shifts and
the number of investment projects is reduced, the size of the government
bureaucracy is also reduced, and therefore the labor supply increases (last
term in 28, Eq. 2). This equilibrium effect on the size of the public sector
tends to increase output. Were entrepreneurs to bear the costs of government
bureaucrats’ wages, the first effect would dominate this last one, and the
overall effect of the level of regulations on output would be unambiguously
negative.
In Equilibrium two, an increase in α does not change the set of agents
who become entrepreneurs, but it alters, at the margin, the compliance de-
cision and therefore the nature of the optimal plan: First, there are fewer
plan 1 entrepreneurs (first term in 28, Eq. 2), and more plan 2 entrepreneurs
(second term). Only a fraction p of the new plan 2 entrepreneurs will pro-
duce, but they will produce more net output. The overall effect of α on
output is therefore ambiguous. Finally, there is an inframarginal effect on
the remaining plan 1 entrepreneurs, captured by the last term in (28, Eq. 2).
For the effects of α on the public good, note that we have defined X as a
public ‘bad’, so a decrease in X is welfare enhancing. The expression for X
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is
X =
{
(γ − α)(1−G(R3)) in Equilibrium 1
pγ(G(R1)−G(R2)) + (γ − α)(1−G(R1)) in Equilibrium 2
(29)
Taking derivatives with respect to α yields
∂X
∂α
=
{ −(1−G(R3))− (γ − α)g(R3)∂R3
∂α
in Equilibrium 1
−g(R1)∂R1
∂α
(γ(1− p)− α)− (1−G(R1)) in Equilibrium 2
(30)
In Equilibrium one, an increase in α reduces the number of projects, so if
α < γ and each project creates a net (negative) externality, increasing α will
induce both marginal and inframarginal improvements (reductions) in the
level of the public good X.
In Equilibrium two, there are two effects. First, there is an inframarginal
effect of a higher α on all the remaining plan 1 entrepreneurs, which reduces
X. Second, for the marginal entrepreneurs who switched to plan 2 (there
are g(R1)∂R1
∂α
of them), they do not contribute α to abate the externality
anymore, but only a fraction p of them will create new externalities by pro-
ducing. The net addition to the public good for each one of these marginal
projects is (α − γ(1 − p)). If this expression is negative, the overall sign is
also negative.
Note that in both cases, if regulations are low with respect to the exter-
nality, so that α ≤ γ(1 − p), an increase in the strength of the regulations
will improve (reduce) unambiguously the level of the public good.
3.3 Equilibrium under High red tape
Before examining the comparative static results, it will be useful to state
here the main characteristics of the equilibrium under high red tape. In
the economy with High red tape, entrepreneurs are required to obtain two
certifications from public officials, and do so sequentially, as only one official
can be drawn per period. In appendix D we derive explicitly the expressions
characterizing this equilibrium. The first result we obtain is that, as in the
previous economy, at most two plans are used in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 In an economy with High Red Tape,
1. There are two non dominated strategies:
{Λ, sh, sc} ∈ {{1, accept, accept}, {0, search, accept}} (31)
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2. There are three levels of R, {R4, R5, R6}, with R4 = z1(δ, p, θ) × α +
z2(δ, p, θ) × i, R5 = z3(δ, p, θ) × i + z4(δ, p, θ), and R6 = z5(δ, p, θ) ×
(α + i) + z6(δ, p, θ), such that:
(a) Plan 1 is preferred to plan 2 for all R > R4.
(b) Plan 2 is preferred to working for all R > R5.
(c) Plan 1 is preferred to working for all R > R6.
Proof: See appendix D.
We are interested in comparing the cutoff points R4 to R6 with the respective
cutoff points for the Low red tape economy. Note that these cutoff points
have the same structure as R1 to R3: linear in α, R, and i, and nonlinear
in the parameters {δ, p, θ}, but they are cumbersome and hard to compare
analytically with the equivalent expressions for the equilibrium under Low
red tape. We resort to simulations in order to compare the coefficients in the
equilibrium expressions. Note that these coefficients are functions of {δ, p, θ}
and therefore map the bounded set (0, 1)3 into R. We use a fine grid for
the domain in obtaining the numerical results that follow, so they must be
understood to hold for all parameter values.
Numerical Result 1 In the economy with High red tape we have R4 > R1,
R5 > R2, and R6 > R3.
Appendix D documents the derivation of this result. The structure of optimal
plans is the same as in the economy with Low red tape, because the draws
of officials are independent. It is natural then that the equilibria are similar.
Corollary 2 Equilibria with High red tape
In an economy with High red tape there are two types of equilibria, and the
condition separating them is
α > ( δ(1−pθ)
2
(1−pθδ)2
(1−δ)+2δp(1−θ)
δp2(1−θ)2 − (1−pθδ)
2−δ2(1−pθ)2
(1−δ)(1−pθδ)2 )
+i( δ(1−pθ)
2
(1−pθδ)2
(1−δ)2+2δp(1−δ)(1−θ)
δp2(1−θ)2 − (1−pθδ)
2−δ2(1−pθ)2
(1−pθδ)2 ). (32)
This condition separates the equilibria as follows:
Equilibrium 1 If 32 does not hold, agents with R ∈ (0, R6) will choose to
work. Agents with R ∈ [R6,∞) will become entrepreneurs, abide by the
regulations, and choose to pay bribes if they draw a corrupt official.
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Equilibrium 2 If 32 holds, agents in R ∈ (0, R5) will choose to work, agents
with R ∈ [R5, R4) will invest, not abide by the regulations, and search
for a corrupt official. Finally, agents with R ∈ [R4,∞) will follow the
regulations, and pay the bribe if they draw a corrupt official.
Note that the condition on the parameters that separates the two equilibria
has the same structure as condition 26 for the Low red tape economy. The
main effect of red tape in this model is to create a time delay between invest-
ment and production. The tradeoffs between the costs of waiting and those
of complying that drove choice of optimal plan in the Low red tape economy
are the same that drive such choice in this economy.
3.4 Comparative statics: Red tape
We now examine the effects of red tape on output and the level of the public
good. We have in mind a policy change from a Low to a High red tape
environment. Because searching takes time, an entrepreneur will be able to
produce at most at a frequency of one half periods (or every two periods).
Hence, to obtain a stationary level of output and the public good, we assume
that the policy transition occurs as follows: At the time of the policy change
from a Low to a High red tape environment, the government awards half of
the agents with one of the two certifications. In appendix C we show that
this is sufficient to guarantee a stationary level of aggregate outcomes, as well
as convergence to this level after a transition. In what follows we disregard
the transition period and focus on stationary states.
Because the condition that separates the two equilibria is different in both
economies, it is important for the comparative static analysis to determine
whether the type of equilibrium will switch as a result of the policy change.
The next result states the type of equilibrium switching that may occur.
Numerical Result 2 After a policy change from a Low red tape to a High
red tape environment,
1. If the economy is in equilibrium 1, it will stay in equilibrium 1 in the
new environment.
2. If the economy is in equilibrium 2, it may be in either type of equilibrium
in the new environment.
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Result 2 simplifies the comparative static analysis by dividing the parameter
space into three, as figure 3 shows. If conditions 26 and 32 hold (A3), the
economy is in Equilibrium 2 in both red tape regimes; If 26 holds but not 32
(A2), the economy switches from Equilibrium 2 in the Low red tape regime
to Equilibrium 1 in the High red tape regime; If neither condition holds (A1),
the economy stays in Equilibrium 1 in both regimes.
We begin by examining the effects of red tape on output:
4Y
4RT =

1
2
∫∞
R6
(R− i− α)dG(R) + (2G(R6)− 1)
− ∫∞
R3
(R− i− α)dG(R)− (2G(R3)− 1) if {i, α, δ, p, θ} ∈ A1
1
2
∫∞
R6
(R− i− α)dG(R) + (2G(R6)− 1)
−1
2
p
∫ R1
R2
(R− i)dG(R)− 1
2
∫∞
R1
(R− i− α)dG(R)
−(2G(R2)− 1) if {i, α, δ, p, θ} ∈ A2
1
2
p
∫ R4
R5
(R− i)dG(R) + 1
2
∫∞
R4
(R− i− α)dG(R)
+(2G(R5)− 1)− p ∫ R1
R2
(R− i)dG(R)
− ∫∞
R1
(R− i− α)dG(R)− (2G(R2)− 1) if {i, α, δ, p, θ} ∈ A3
(33)
In general, these expressions cannot be signed given the equilibrium effect of a
reduction in investment projects on the size of the public sector bureaucracy.
We consider in detail the case of {δ, p, θ} ∈ A1. There are three effects:
First, there are fewer profitable projects, as R6 > R3, and therefore output
is reduced. The expression for this effect is∫ ∞
R6
(R− i−α)dG(R)−
∫ ∞
R3
(R− i−α)dG(R) + (G(R6)− 1)− (G(R3)− 1),
and is smaller than zero. Second, the projects that remain profitable are
operational with a lower frequency, and the expression for this effect is
−1
2
∫∞
R6
(R − i − α)dG(R), which is negative. Finally, because of the first
effect the externality that operates on the size of the public sector tends to
increase output by a margin equal to G(R6)−G(R3), as government workers
are put to productive use. The sum of the three effects gives the expression
for 4Y4RT above. For the case {δ, p, θ} ∈ A2, it can be shown that R3 < R5,
so in this case as well as in {δ, p, θ} ∈ A3 a similar picture emerges. For the
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effects of red tape on the public good, the expressions are
4X
4RT =

1
2
(γ − α)(1−G(R6))− (γ − α)(1−G(R3)) if {i, α, δ, p, θ} ∈ A1
1
2
(γ − α)(1−G(R6))
−pγ(G(R1)−G(R2))− (γ − α)(1−G(R1)) if {i, α, δ, p, θ} ∈ A2
1
2
pγ(G(R4)−G(R5)) + 1
2
(γ − α)(1−G(R4))
−pγ(G(R1)−G(R2))− (γ − α)(1−G(R1)) if {i, alpha, δ, p, θ} ∈ A3
(34)
Under {δ, p, θ} ∈ A1, because there are fewer projects, if projects create a
net externality (γ > α so X > 0), the level of the public good will improve
( 4X4RT < 0). In the remaining two cases, the existence of plan 2 entrepreneurs
who create high levels of net externalities makes it difficult to sign the ex-
pressions. We expect however that the reduction in the overall quantity of
operational projects under High red tape would empirically dominate compo-
sitional effects, so that X would be decreased in absolute value in a High red
tape environment. These results leave open the possibility that an increase
in red tape may bring a welfare improvement with it, a point that we explore
in the next section.
4 Optimal government policies
We are interested in characterizing the socially optimal levels of regulations
and red tape in economies with corruption, and comparing them with the
optimal policies in a no corruption economy. In particular, we are interested
in whether the level of regulations can be used effectively to reduce the dead-
weight loss caused by corruption, and whether -and in which conditions- a
higher level of red tape can be used as a second best policy.
The social welfare function used here gives all agents, including corrupt
officials, the same weight. It can be represented by
W = Y −X (35)
We begin by studying the optimal level of regulations in an economy with
low red tape. In an economy with no corruption, the planner solves
max
α
∫ ∞
R?
(R− i)dG(R) + (2G(R?)− 1)− γ(1−G(R?)) (36)
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With R? = α + i+ 1. In this case, the optimal level of regulations is
α0 = γ + 1 (37)
At this level of α entrepreneurs internalize the marginal social costs of both
the public good (γ), and the government bureaucracy (w = 1). With no
corruption, everyone complies with the regulations, so there is no scope for
more red tape to improve on the allocation: A Low level of red tape is optimal
in this case.
In an economy with corruption, we need to distinguish optimal regulations
under the two types of equilibrium. The optimal level of regulations, at the
interior of the parameter space for each Equilibrium, takes the following form:
αp =
{
γ 1−pθ
1−pθδ + i
−pθ(1−δ)
1−pθδ +
1−pθ
1−pθδ (2− 11−pθ ) in Eq. 1
γ 1−p
1−pθδ + i
(1−δ)(1−p)
1−pθδ in Eq. 2
(38)
The role of αp in Equilibrium 1 is to align private costs of investment with
social costs by setting R3 = R?. For Equilibrium 2, α does not affect the
choices of plan 2 entrepreneurs, who do not follow the regulations. The plan-
ner sets α so that R1 = γ + i, which makes plan 1 entrepreneurs internalize
the full marginal social cost of their decision. Since their alternative at the
margin is to follow plan 2, the wages of government bureaucrats are not in
this case part of their social marginal costs. Note that R1 < R?, so all plan
2 entrepreneurs, as well as some plan 1 entrepreneurs, are socially inefficient,
but α cannot be used as a policy tool to drive marginal entrepreneurs out of
the market.
Compared to an economy with no corruption, the socially optimal level
of regulations αp is lower in Equilibrium 1, and may be higher or lower in
Equilibrium 2. In Equilibrium 1, the coefficient of αpmultiplying γ is positive
and smaller than one; the coefficient multiplying i is negative, and we have
(2− 1
1−pθ < 1). In Equilibrium 2, the coefficient on i is positive, and that on
γ is smaller than one.
Figure 4 depicts αp for given parameter values in the {γ, p} space. For
a small interval of γ neither solution given by 38 falls on the interior of the
parameter space for the respective equilibrium. In this case the solution is
at a corner, and given by h(i, p, θ, δ) in expression 26. Optimal regulations
are decreasing in corruption incidence, except for a jump where the economy
switches from equilibrium 1 to 2. As discussed above, optimal regulations
solve qualitatively different problems in both equilibria.
19
An important question is to what extent this policy tool allows the planner
to correct the distortions caused by corruption. The following proposition
states that under certain conditions setting the level of regulations optimally
may restore the first best.
Proposition 2 Correcting the distortions caused by corruption using the
level of regulations:
1. In Equilibrium 1, the optimal level of regulations achieves the first best
allocation
2. In Equilibrium 2, the optimal level of regulations achieves a second best
allocation
Proof: In Equilibrium 1, the objective function is
W =
∫ ∞
R3
(R− i)dG(R) + (2G(R3)− 1)− γ(1−G(R3)) (39)
And substitution of the optimal level of regulations in R3 gives R3 = i+γ+1,
which is the socially optimal cutoff point in the economy without corruption.
The social welfare function in 39 is therefore the same as that with no cor-
ruption, in 36. In Equilibrium 2, this policy tool cannot align the incentives
for plan 2 entrepreneurs, as they do not internalize the cost of the public
good.
Clearly, the result for Equilibrium 1 is not without distributional impli-
cations. In setting the level of α lower than in the first best, the planner
corrects for the underinvestment caused by the costs of bribes, and aligns
the prices faced by entrepreneurs with the socially optimal prices. The con-
sequence is that the level of the public good worsens, as X is higher, and
therefore workers are worse off.
We now consider the joint choice of α and Red Tape by the planner. From
the discussion in the previous section, it should be clear that, if no structure
is placed on the level of regulations, there is scope for more Red Tape to
improve welfare. We are interested rather on the conditions, if any, under
which more Red Tape can improve on the allocation in an economy with an
optimal level of regulations. From the previous proposition we know that this
will not happen if the economy is in Equilibrium 1. If the economy starts in
Equilibrium 2 however, high levels of externalities (γ), which in turn imply
high optimal levels of regulations, will turn red tape into a Pareto improving
policy. These results are formalized below
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Proposition 3 Red Tape and welfare under optimal regulations:
1. If the economy is in Equilibrium 1 ({i, α, δ, p, θ} ∈ A1) Red Tape will
always decrease welfare.
2. If {i, α, δ, p, θ} ∈ A3, as γ →∞ more red tape increases welfare.
Proof: Point 1 follows from the fact that in Equilibrium 1 optimal regulations
can achieve the first best. For point 2, note that the derivative of 4W4RT with
respect to γ is
∂ 4W4RT
∂γ
= −1
2
(G(R4)−G(R5))−1
2
(1−G(R4))+p(G(R1)−G(R2))+(1−G(R1))
(40)
The limit of this expression as γ →∞ is p(1−G(R2))− 1
2
p(1−G(R5)) > 0,
so increasing the level of red tape improves welfare for γ above a threshold.
In the intermediate case where {i, α, δ, p, θ} ∈ A2 whether Red tape improves
welfare or not depends on the form of the distribution G(R), as well as the
parameters. When {i, α, δ, p, θ} ∈ A3, the level of regulations is a poor
policy tool to restrict the number of inefficient firms from operating, as it
only affects the margin of the optimal plan for entrepreneurs. If the negative
externality is large enough, there will be a large number of inefficient firms
operating. In this case it may be efficient to drive some firms out of the
market by increasing the costs associated with red tape, even if this creates
large intframarginal losses to the remaining firms. It is worth recalling that
this case will occur under high levels of corruption for a given γ.
To complete the analysis in this section we turn to the effects of cor-
ruption in an economy with optimal regulations. An important question in
the literature is whether corruption may have positive effects on output and
welfare (see, for instance, Huntington [1968]). In particular, it has been sug-
gested that corruption has a “speed money” effect, which may “grease the
wheels of commerce” by allowing investors to circumvent costly regulations.
The following result summarizes the effects of corruption on output and wel-
fare when regulations are set optimally. We assume that a Low level of red
tape is optimal
Proposition 4 Effects of corruption on output and welfare under optimal
regulations:
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1. In Equilibrium 1, corruption increases output but leaves welfare un-
changed.
2. In Equilibrium 2, corruption increases output , up to the effect on the
size of the public bureaucracy, and decreases welfare.
Proof: For point 1, note that the effects of corruption on output in Equilib-
rium 1 are
∂Y
∂p
=
∂α
∂p
(1−G(R3)) (41)
Where the derivative is taken with respect to the optimal level of α, and is
negative. As for welfare, the effects are zero by the envelope theorem.
For point 2, the effects of corruption on output in Equilibrium 2 are given
by
∂Y
∂p
=
∫ R1
R2
(R− i)dG(R) + g(R2)∂R2
∂p
(2− p(R2− i− γ)) (42)
The first effect is the speed money effect: as corruption increases, en-
trepreneurs who follow plan 2 have a higher probability of obtaining a cer-
tification. The second effect is the effect of increasing the measure of en-
trepreneurs who follow plan 2, and should be positive (as ∂R2
∂p
< 0) save
for the effect that increasing entrepreneurship has on the demand for public
officials.
The effect of corruption on welfare is
∂W
∂p
=
∫ R1
R2
(R−i)dG(R)+g(R2)∂R2
∂p
(2−p(R2−i−γ))−γ(G(R1)−G(R2))
(43)
So a third negative effect enters into play, as plan 2 entrepreneurs will create
more externalities. Since the marginal plan 2 entrepreneurs are socially in-
efficient, their marginal contribution to social welfare is negative, so the sign
of ∂W
∂p
is negative.
Note that these results hold when the level of regulations is set optimally. In
Equilibrium 1 in particular, if the level of regulations is lower than the op-
timum, more corruption increases welfare, by closing the gap between social
and private costs. If α is higher than the optimum, the effect is reversed and
welfare decreases.
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5 Conclusion
We present an economy where the government sets up regulations to cor-
rect a production externality. Red tape is imposed as a mechanism to test
regulation compliance, and is administered by government officials. In an en-
vironment where some officials are corrupt, we derive positive and normative
results regarding the two policy tools the government has access to.
For a given level of externalities, we find that high and low corruption
create distortions that are qualitatively different, and call for government
policies that are also different in nature and reach. In our model, the equi-
librium is characterized by a convex threshold in the externalities and corrup-
tion space, below which the government can mandate levels of regulations
and (minimal) levels of red tape such that the economy is first best effi-
cient. Above this threshold, optimal policies cannot achieve the first best.
Moreover, we obtain the somewhat surprising result that , with the levels of
externalities above a second threshold, more red tape is Pareto improving.
In this case, a large class of entrepreneurs choose to operate without abiding
by the regulations, so the level of these is ineffective to increase the cost and
drive out of the market socially inefficient producers.
The normative results derived in this paper are necessary to make sense
of the efficiency effects of the two policy tools under study. As discussed
in Joel S. Hellman and Kaufmann [2000] and Djankov et al. [2002] however,
in highly corrupt economies the correlations between corruption, regulations,
and red tape need to be understood as a political economy equilibrium where
corrupt bureaucrats seek to manipulate institutional rules to their advantage.
Because corruption itself is slow to get rid of, the analysis in this paper
provides a normative benchmark to the studies just cited.
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A There are two policies that are not domi-
nated
The list of possible plans {Λ, sh, sc} is
1. {1, accept, accept}
2. {0, search, accept}
3. {1, search, accept}
4. {1, accept, search}
5. {1, search, search}
6. {0, search, search}
Plans 5 and 6 can be eliminated, since they lead to negative profits of −i−α
and −i respectively, which are dominated by working.
We first derive the payoffs for plans 1 to 4.
• Plan 1: {1, accept, accept}
The value functions take the form
vc(1) = R− β + δve (44)
vh(1) = R + δve (45)
vs(1) = pvc + (1− p)vh (46)
ve = −i− α + vs(1) (47)
Substitution of vc and vh in vs, and vs in v yields
ve(R) =
1
1− δ (R− i− α− pβ) (48)
For the bribe, the problem is
max
β
βθ(R− β + δve − δvs)1−θ (49)
Which yields
β = θ(R + δ(ve − vs)) (50)
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Since ve − vs = −i− α, we have
β = θ(R− δ(i+ α)) (51)
and
ve(R) = R
1− pθ
1− δ − (i+ α)
1− pθδ
1− δ (52)
• Plan 2: {0, search, accept}
The value functions take the form
vc(0) = Ri − β + δve (53)
vh(0) = δve (54)
vs(0) = pvc + (1− p)vh (55)
ve = −i+ vs(0) (56)
The bribe is
β = θ(R− δi) (57)
Substitution of vc and vh in vs yields
vs =
p
1− δ(1− p)(R− β + δve) (58)
Substitution of β in vs and vs in ve yields
ve(R) = R
p(1− θ)
1− δ − i(1 +
δp(1− θ)
1− δ ) (59)
• Plan 3: {1, search, accept}
The value functions take the form
vc(1) = Ri − β + δv (60)
vh(1) = δve (61)
vs(1) = pvc + (1− p)vh (62)
ve = −i− δ + vs(1) (63)
The bribe is
β = θ(R + δ(i+ δ)) (64)
which implies
ve(R) = R
p(1− θ)
1− δ − (i+ α)(1 +
δp(1− θ)
1− δ ) (65)
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• Plan 4: {1, accept, search}
The value functions take the form
vc(1) = δvs (66)
vh(1) = R + δve (67)
vs(1) = pvc + (1− p)vh (68)
ve = −i− δ + vs(1) (69)
The bribe offered is
β = θ(R + δ(i+ δ)) (70)
and we have
vs(1) = vh
1− p
1− δp (71)
which implies
ve(R) = R
1− p
1− δ − (i+ α)
1− δp
1− δ (72)
Note that plan 3 is dominated by plan 2:
ve(plan 2)− ve(plan 3) = α(1 + δp(1− θ)
1− δ )
Plan 4 is dominated by plan 1 for all R such that work is not the dominant
choice. Plan 1 dominates plan 4 for all R > δ(i + α). In turn, under the
following condition plan 4 dominates work
R(1− p)− (i+ α)(1− pδ) > 1 (73)
R > (i+ α)
1− pδ
1− p +
1
1− p (74)
> i+ α (75)
> δ(i+ α) (76)
So plan 4 dominates plan 1 only for R such that work is the dominant plan.
B Plan 2 is observed if and only if R1 > R2
The proof:
⇒ If plan 2 is observed, then R1 > R2. Let R0 be such that plan 2 dominates
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both working and plan 1. Since plan 2 dominates working, we must have
R0 > R2. Since plan 2 dominates plan 1, we must have R0 < R1. This
implies R1 > R2.
⇐ If R1 > R2 there is an R such that plan 2 dominates both plan 1 and
work. Take R0 ∈ (R2, R1). Since R0 > R2, plan 2 dominates work. Since
R0 < R1, plan 2 dominates plan 1.
C Stationary distribution in the model with
high Red Tape
There is a unique stationary equilibrium with one half of the entrepreneurs
holding zero certifications.
We need to look separately at both types of equilibria in the environment
with high red tape.
1. In Equilibrium 1, all entrepreneurs obtain one certification each pe-
riod, and those with vs(., 1) at the beginning of the period produce, so
the only stationary equilibrium is to have 1/2 of the entrepreneurs in
vs(., 0), and 1/2 in vs(., 1).
2. In equilibrium 2, the above argument holds for entrepreneurs who
choose plan 1. For entrepreneurs who follow plan 2, only a fraction
p of them will obtain a new certification each period. The Markov
process for the proportion of plan 2 entrepreneurs in states vs(., 0) and
vs(., 1) is
1− p p
p 1− p
which has a stationary distribution {1/2, 1/2}.
D Equilibrium in the model with high Red
Tape
We begin by stating the problem. We let the arguments in vc,h,s(., .) be
the number of certifications held (0 or 1) and the indicator function for
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compliance with the regulations (1 if complied, 0 otherwise).
The Bellman equations are, for entrepreneurs with zero certifications,
vc(0, 0) = max{δvs(1, 0)− β1, δvs(0, 0)} (77)
vc(0, 1) = max{δvs(1, 1)− β1, δvs(0, 1)} (78)
vh(0, 0) = δvs(0, 0) (79)
vh(0, 1) = max{δvs(0, 1), δvs(1, 1)} (80)
For entrepreneurs with one certification,
vc(1, 0) = max{Ri − β2 + δve, δvs(1, 0)} (81)
vc(1, 1) = max{Ri − β2 + δve, δvs(1, 1)} (82)
vh(1, 0) = δvs(1, 0) (83)
vh(1, 1) = max{Ri + δve, δvs(1, 1)} (84)
For vs
vs(., .) = pvc(., .) + (1− p)vh(., .) (85)
For ve
ve(R) = max{−i+ vs(0, 0),−i− α + vs(0, 1), w
1− δ} (86)
Note that there will be a different bribe for entrepreneurs who have not ob-
tained a certification yet (β1), and one for entrepreneurs with one certification
(β2). These bribes take the following general form
β1 = θδ(ve − vs(1, .)) (87)
β2 = θ(R + δve − δvs(1, .)) (88)
In what follows we characterize the equilibrium.
1. Two plans are not dominated.
Note that, because draws of government officials are independent for the
first and second certification, optimal plans will not be made contingent
on the history of draws. This implies that we have to look at the same
four plans as in the model with low red tape. These plans are:
(a) {1, accept, accept}
(b) {0, search, accept}
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(c) {1, search, accept}
(d) {1, accept, search}
We compute the payoffs of these plans for completeness. Then we show
that plans 3 and 4 are dominated.
(a) Plan 1: {1, accept, accept}
vs(1, 1) = (R− δ(i+ α)) (1− pθδ)(1− pθ)
(1− pθδ)2 − δ2(1− pθ)2 (89)
vs(0, 1) = (R− δ(i+ α)) δ(1− pθ)
2
(1− pθδ)2 − δ2(1− pθ)2 (90)
ve = R
δ(1− pθ)2
(1− pθδ)2 − δ2(1− pθ)2
−(i+ α)(1 + δ
2(1− pθ)2
(1− pθδ)2 − δ2(1− pθ)2 ) (91)
(b) Plan 2: {0, search, accept}
vs(1, 0) = (R− δi)p(1− θ)(1− δpθ − (δ(1− p)
(1− δ)2 + 2pδ(1− δ)(1− θ) (92)
vs(0, 0) = (R− δi) δp
2(1− θ)2
(1− δ)2 + 2pδ(1− δ)(1− θ) (93)
ve = R
δp2(1− θ)2
(1− δ)2 + 2pδ(1− δ)(1− θ)
−i(1 + δ
2p2(1− θ)2
(1− δ)2 + 2pδ(1− δ)(1− θ)) (94)
(c) Plan 3: {1, search, accept}
vs(1, 1) = (R− δ(i+ δ) p(1− θ)
1− δ(1− p+ pθ) + vs(0, 1)
δp(1− θ)
1− δ(1− p+ pθ)(95)
vs(0, 1) = (R− δ(i+ δ)) δp
2(1− θ)2
(1− δ(1− p+ pθ))2 − δ2(1− θ)2 (96)
ve = R
δp2(1− θ)2
(1− δ(1− p+ pθ))2 − δ2(1− θ)2
−(i+ δ) (1− δ(1− p+ pθ))
2
(1− δ(1− p+ pθ))2 − δ2(1− θ)2 (97)
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(d) Plan 4: {1, accept, search}
vs(1, 1) = (R− δ(i+ α)) (1− p)(1− pδ)
(1− pδ)2 − δ2(1− p)2 (98)
vs(0, 1) = (R− δ(i+ α)) (1− p)
2δ(1− pδ)
(1− pδ)2 − δ2(1− p)2 (99)
ve = R
(1− p)2δ(1− pδ)
(1− pδ)2 − δ2(1− p)2
−(i+ α)(1 + (1− p)
2δ2(1− pδ)
(1− pδ)2 − δ2(1− p)2 (100)
2. Plans 3 and 4 are dominated
For plan 3 {1, search, accept}, we show that it cannot be optimal. Note
that in this case
vh(0, 1) = max{δvs(0, 1), δvs(1, 1)}.
For this plan to be optimal it is necessary that vs(0, 1) > vs(1, 1), but
we know that vs(0, 1) < vs(1, 1), because someone with one certification
can always mimic the search behavior of someone with zero certifica-
tions, and obtain the payoff Ri + δv in a lower expected time.
For plan 4 {1, accept, search} to be optimal, it must be that
vc(1, 1) = max{(1− θ)(R + δv) + θδvs(1, 1), δvs(1, 1)} (101)
= δvs(1, 1) (102)
But note that
vs(1, 1) = pvc(1, 1) + (1− p)vh(1, 1) (103)
< vh(1, 1) (104)
= R + δv (105)
Since δ < 1 we have (106)
δvs(1, 1) < R + δv (107)
δvs(1, 1)(1− θ) < (1− θ)(R + δv) (108)
(1− θ)(R + δv) + θδvs(1, 1) > δvs(1, 1) (109)
Which implies tha vc(1, 1) = (1 − θ)(R + δv) + θδvs(1, 1): Search if
facing a corrupt official cannot be optimal.
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3. The cutoff points
(a) Plan 1 is preferred to plan 2
R4 = iδ + α
1+
δ2(1−pθ)2
(1−pδθ)2−δ2(1−pθ)2
δ(1−pθ)2
(1−pδθ)2−δ2(1−pθ)2−
δp2(1−θ)2
(1−δ)2+(1−δ)+2pδ(1−δ)(1−θ)
(110)
(b) Plan 2 is preferred to working
R5 = i(δ +
(1− δ)2 + 2pδ(1− δ)(1− θ)
δp2(1− θ)2 ) +
(1− δ) + 2pδ(1− θ)
δp2(1− θ)2
(111)
(c) Plan 1 is preferred to working
R6 = (i+ α)
(1− pθδ)2
δ(1− pθ)2 +
(1− pθδ)2
δ(1− δ)(1− pθ)2 −
δ
1− δ (112)
4. Numerical result 1
We perform pairwise numerical comparisons of the coefficients on R
and (i + α), which are functions of {p, α, δ}, by using a discrete grid
for the parameters, which lie in (0, 1)3. We use a 303 point grid.
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Figure 1: Timing of decisions for entrepreneurs
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Figure 2: Equilibria in the Low red tape economy (i = 1, θ = .6, δ = .9).
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Figure 3: Equilibrium switching in the transition to a High red tape economy
(θ = .6,δ = .9, i = 1).
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Figure 4: Optimal level of regulations in the Low red tape economy. (θ =
.6,δ = .9, i = 10)..
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